EV_1771793223698supports
Sanctions research began with Galtung's (1967) examination of the effects of the United Nations embargo on Rhodesia, which concluded that the embargo had not weakened the Rhodesian regime but had instead strengthened its grip on power, producing a consensus that sanctions were invariably ineffectual in compelling targets to change their policies.
other
probative: high
CB_01
EV_1771793223699supports
The consensus in academic literature is that conventional trade and financial sanctions result in some meaningful behavioral change in the targeted country about 40 percent of the time.
other
probative: high
CB_01
EV_1771793223700supports
Most targeted sanctions, such as bans on the sale of luxury goods and sectoral sanctions, have an even lower success rate at about 20 percent.
other
probative: high
CB_01
EV_1771793223701supports
Critics of international sanctions posit that they are often ill-conceived and, in most cases, fail to achieve their objectives.
other
probative: medium
CB_01
EV_1771793223702supports
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott's (1985) large-N study claimed that 34 percent of twentieth-century sanctions regimes had been successful, which was contested by scholars who argued that sanctions still did not work.
other
probative: high
CB_03
EV_1771793223703supports
Pape's (1997, 1998) critique of the Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott study argued that they had simply mischaracterised many cases as successes: targets' concessions were either wrongly classified, or generated by factors other than sanctions.
other
probative: high
CB_03
EV_1771793223704supports
Sanctions are less effective in achieving major policy objectives like military impairment or political regime change than achieving modest policy goals like releasing a political prisoner or resolving a minor trade dispute.
other
probative: medium
CB_01
EV_1771793250649supports
The 2022 sanctions on Russia have not been an unequivocal success, with unclear communication about objectives both before and after the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and inconsistent government communication regarding sanctions assessment during early months of the war.
other
probative: high
CB_05
EV_1771793250650supports
Russia's economy appeared to have stabilized by 2023 with reported GDP growth of 3.6% following moderate contraction in 2022, supported by nearly 10 percent of GDP in war-related fiscal stimulus and sanction coalition countries' reluctance to stop buying Russian oil and gas completely.
other
probative: high
CB_05
EV_1771793250651supports
Enforcement of 2022 sanctions struggled since inception, with weak enforcement rendering sanctions ineffective on paper, and 'black knights' aiding Russia in circumventing sanctions, highlighting the gap between theoretical measures and their practical impact.
other
probative: high
CB_05
EV_1771793250652supports
Seeking complete isolation from a large, complex, and globally integrated economy is costly and likely unattainable, resulting in some governments not pursuing such a goal and Russia's oil continuing to flow freely to the market.
other
probative: medium
CB_05
EV_1771793250653supports
Sanctions, while a critical tool of economic statecraft, are not a guaranteed solution to end wars or alter a country's behavior, with efficacy depending on factors such as target country's size and global integration, sanctioning coalition's unity, enforcement ability, and economic burden on sanctioning nations.
other
probative: high
CB_05
EV_1771793250654supports
The initial 2014 sanctions on Russia following Crimea invasion failed to force Russia to backtrack, though they likely contributed to its decision not to advance further in 2014.
other
probative: medium
CB_07
EV_1771793250655supports
Over two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the impact and efficacy of sanctions against Russia remain highly uncertain and contested, with growing consensus that sanctions have failed to achieve their objectives.
other
probative: high
CB_05
EV_1771793250656supports
Impact and effectiveness of sanctions are not the same thing; material damage caused by sanctions measures is not necessarily connected with political gains that originate from their adoption.
other
probative: medium
CB_05
EV_1771793250657supports
Poor coordination among political actors operating in highly integrated economic systems means that sanctions can be avoided in multiple ways, and sanctions in integrated economies are deeply influenced by how the private sector behaves.
other
probative: high
CB_07
EV_1771793291710supports
Economic sanctions are often intended to achieve foreign and security policy goals such as fighting terrorism, protecting democracy and human rights, or resolving conflicts, but evidence-based studies examine the extent to which various sanctions have actually achieved their goals.
other
probative: high
CB_09
EV_1771793291711supports
The journal issue title explicitly frames sanctions as having goals they fail to achieve, indicating that empirical evidence demonstrates sanctions frequently do not accomplish their intended objectives.
other
probative: medium
CB_09
EV_1771793311116supports
Since 2019, average technical jail sanctions days nearly doubled in length, yet jail sanctions negatively impact people on supervision, especially people who are homeless and mentally ill, and perpetuate racial inequity without achieving stated departmental goals of behavior change.
other
probative: high
CB_11
EV_1771793311117supports
Application of the first jail sanction during drug court participation was associated with treatment failure (hazard ratio 2.71, p < 0.0001), with particularly strong association when sanctions were administered earlier in participation (HR 11.34 at < 30 days, p = 0.0002), suggesting sanctions may undermine treatment completion goals.
peer_reviewed_study
probative: high
CB_11